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1 Introduction
The MANET is a decentralized kind of network, where nodes of the network relay 
packet to each other on the concept of the store and forward, i.e. nodes may also act 
as routers finding and maintaining routes to one another. Here, nodes can partici-
pate freely and leave without centralized control. Generally, due to the varying veloc-
ity of mobile nodes, the network topology may variate arbitrarily and rapidly in an 
irregular way. Therefore, the phenomenon of frequent link breakage is quite common. 
The moments of nodes are independent of one another, unlike others which use com-
mitted nodes to endorse functions such as network management, packet forward-
ing, and routing [1]. These functions are distributed to all available nodes by the ad 
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hoc networks since the ambiance causes the nodes to be easily captured and com-
promised. Hence, it is essential to provide security measures [2, 3]. Therefore, secu-
rity in MANET is a crucial consideration. In addition, the routing of operations could 
also be easily compromised if safety measures are not integrated into the network 
functions.
In general, in MANETs, routing protocols are designed with assumptions that every 
participating node will fully cooperate with each other. This network does not have 
any type of centrally administrative services. All networks that function such as net-
work control, routing, forwarding packets, including switching, etc., are communicated 
between terminals (nodes) either in cooperation or independently. Therefore, coordina-
tion between nodes is rather solicited. However, due to its transparent characteristics 
and restricted on-hand battery power of nodes, malicious activities can also be done in 
this network. Moreover, the MANETs structure may differ based on their various appli-
cations from static, small to dynamic, highly mobile in nature (vehicular, FANET, etc.), 
and large-scale network which is highly energy constrained [4, 5].
In the MANET environment, the array of mobile wireless nodes is interconnected 
either for generic aims such as time-critical applications like tactical, law enforcement, 
and emergency operations or for distinct goals like only shares their resources for ensur-
ing global connectivity [6]. However, few resources, for example, battery power, are 
consumed rapidly as participating nodes have to perform network functioning tasks. 
When node power is prime factor for particular environment, so there may chance that 
denying of sharing own resources in order to save battery power [8]. These participating 
nodes are termed as misbehaving or selfish nodes and their activities are called misbe-
haviour or selfishness [10]. This kind of network is a cooperative network. So, in order 
to provide good cooperation among participant nodes, an already significant amount 
of control overheads packets is needed. Therefore, security measures are generally not 
implemented in the protocols to keep the overhead low, i.e. nodes are not checked for 
maliciousness. Due to this reason, MANETs are easy targets for attackers. The attackers 
perform the malicious activity in one and most common way by injecting non-coop-
erative nodes into the network. Therefore, the development and implementation of the 
intrusion detection system become one of the prime duties in this network.
Already, various techniques [7, 9, 11–20] have further presented in the literature 
study in order to identify and reduce the effect of such misbehaviour or selfish nodes 
in a MANET, and VANET (vehicular ad hoc network) environment, that is, inspec-
tions of past works cover intrusion detection and prevention techniques. Many of these 
techniques have been evaluated based on performance metrics and routing schemes 
of MANETs. Among various techniques, Watchdog, Pathrater, and 2-ACK [11, 23] are 
highlighted one, which can significantly identify and reduce the impact of network mali-
ciousness, respectively. Watchdog provides the mechanism to recognize bad elements in 
the network by overhearing the wireless transmission media and is the passive type of 
overhearing method, while the Pathrater technique does not allow malicious nodes to 
participate in the process of route determination. 2-ACK security scheme reduces the 
bad effect of such immoral elements. From a previously reported works, one can observe 
that still various issues like obscure and receiver collision, false behaviour, limited 
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transmission range, etc., still need to be addressed and can be considered as a weakness 
of most highlighted security techniques.
Our proposed system uses the cryptographic mechanism to make the network secure 
and try to overcome the above-mentioned weakness. Three important security aspects 
of MANET have been considered, namely secure acknowledgment, node authentication, 
and packet authentication. Our presented DSSAM performs better, in the sense of iden-
tification of malicious nodes and its activities, but with the cost of the significant amount 
of overheads.
DSSAM is well suited in high level use of various Internet of things (IoT) application 
scenarios where the proposal will be applicable as security solution in terminal to ter-
minal communications at hybrid ad hoc network solutions. Actually, IoT is the next eon 
of communication in which physical objects can be empowered to create, receive, and 
exchange data in a seamless manner with heterogeneous network environment also. The 
various IoT applications focus on automating different tasks and are trying to empower 
the inanimate physical objects to act without any human intervention. The existing and 
upcoming IoT applications are highly promising to increase the level of comfort, effi-
ciency, and automation for the users and for such environment. To be capable to gizmo 
such an ecosphere in a constantly emergent approach requires better and high security, 
authentication, privacy, and recovery from attacks. In this respect, it is imperious to 
make the required modifications in the design of IoT applications for achieving secure 
IoT atmospheres. In this paper, a detailed discussion and improvement over watchdog 
to 2-ACK and then 2-ACK to DSSAM method is explained with considering few per-
formance metrics. The proposed DSSAM approach will help to achieve a high degree 
of trust and increase the level of security in the potential useful IoT applications with 
hybrid environment such as:
a. Smart transportation system.
b. Smart agriculture and animal farming.
c. Smart emergencies environment.
d. Smart communication at defence scenario.
e. Smart commercial, residential and Industrial area, and many more.
1.1  Motivations and principal contributions
Since the last few decades, the outlook of wireless networking is drastically changing 
due to fast growth in wireless technologies and requirements of new wireless services 
and various applications as well. The wireless industries have experienced unexcelled 
growth, from satellite broadcasts into countless households to Wireless Personal Area 
Networks (WPAN) [13], VANET [15], WSN [16], etc. Consequently, the cost of wire-
less access falls; hence, it can replace wired access in many aspects. One of the greatest 
advantages of wireless is to provide connectivity among users while roaming. However, 
the distance between users is limited due to the short distance of transmitter or their 
vicinity to Wireless Access Point (WAP) [13]. Later, in the 70s onward era, the develop-
ment of MANET has overcome this problem by involving intermediate nodes to forward 
data packets to the outside range of nodes [1, 2].
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One of the most vibrant and rapidly growing fields nowadays is the MANET. It is also 
called as the wireless mobile multi-hop or mobile packet radio network. In this realm, 
significant research is going on since last nearly fifty years in order to its betterment. 
Due to infrastructure-less, self-configuring, and self-motivated properties of MANET, 
it has got possible future applications in different fields such as tactical environments, 
emergency operations, home and enterprise, commercial, civilian environments, traf-
fic environment [19], location-aware services, and extension of coverage [8, 14]. This 
network is vulnerable due to its important features such as distributed service, open 
medium, autonomous terminal, dynamic topology, lightweight terminals, asymmetrical 
communication, fluctuating link capacity, and constrained capability [27]. These above 
fundamental characteristics introduce several challenges for researchers in the MANET 
environment, where security issue is one of the significant issues. MANET can maximize 
its Quality of Service (QoS) parameters such as throughput, Packet Delivery Fraction 
(PDF), etc., by using all the intermediate nodes accessible to route and then forwarding 
packets. However, the node can consequently behave badly by refusing to supply provid-
ers or shedding down the packets in the community due to the fact of its selfishness, 
malicious exercise, etc. [28, 29]. Identifying and preventing misbehaving nodes from 
them can be one of the biggest challenges for a network like that. The principal contribu-
tions of the current research article are as follows:
a. State-of-the-art of various user authentication schemes and intrusion detection 
strategies have been analysed for the MANET and WSN environment.
b. The MANET application layer has attracted vast research as well as the scientific 
community during the last few decades. As a result, many user authentication tech-
niques for MANET and WSN have been proposed and published in the literature. 
Among them, a few most closely relevant to our proposed method are explored.
c. Article also discusses the possible security attacks on different security goals along 
with its target and prevention schemes.
d. Due to open and decentralized characteristics of MANET, misbehaving or the sus-
picious nodes may be involved in the process of route discovery. Further, they may 
refuse to provide the information/services in the network, i.e. deny forwarding the 
data packets. Therefore, this article tries to identify the existing intrusion detection 
systems that can identify and prevent disruptive network operations.
e. Existing intrusion detection techniques such as Watchdog and 2-ACK are explored 
in terms of their strength and weakness.
f. To provide secure authentication and an acknowledgment mechanism in MANET, 
we proposed DSSAM that is based on RSA digital signature. This scheme overcomes 
the weakness of existing intrusion detection techniques such as receiver collision and 
false identity problem.
g. Finally, the proposed authentication approach has been compared with the current 
techniques.
This research article is structured as follows: immediate subsequent section presents 
background with a literature survey on co-related work in this area followed by a discus-
sion of intrusion detection techniques in the next section. Moreover, after that digital 
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signature with its needs, including signature creation and verification steps have been 
discussed in the next section followed by problem definition and the proposed method. 
Further, performance evaluations of DSSAM, Watchdog, and 2-ack have been made 
through a simulation study followed by results and discussion. At last, it comes to its 
conclusion and possible future scope.
1.2  Literature survey
The conveyed work in the state-of-the-art of secure acknowledgment in MANET, WSN, 
and related domain by several scientists and researchers has been presented in this 
section.
The work in [23] explained routing misbehaviour in MANETs and suggested a 2-ACK 
technique for identifying and minimizing the impact of selfish nodes in the routing. 
2-ACK is based on a simple 2-hop acknowledgment packet that is returned by the next-
hop link recipient. The 2-ACK mechanism operates as an alternative routing scheme 
strategy for detecting routing misconduct and reducing its adverse effects. The 2-ACK 
mechanism solves several problems, including limited transmission powers, ambiguous 
collisions, and receiver collisions. The 2-ACK scheme can be used efficiently in DSR in 
MANET. Trust Aware Routing Protocol (TARP) as an advanced security routing mecha-
nism based on the level of trust was presented and evaluated [24]. TARP is a technique 
that allows for the search of safe routes in MANET. The authors measured the trust 
parameter based on a defined set of parameters and used it in TARP. The study shows 
that TARP will improve an ad hoc network’s defence and rising routing congestion while 
preserving a reasonable route discovery period and an appropriate pause. The routing 
traffic relates specifically to the collection of nodes that meet the sender’s requirements. 
Two techniques of Watchdog and Pathrater are explained in [11] that helps to increase 
ad hoc network throughput. Both methods are extensions of DSR algorithms to reduce 
the impact of ad hoc network routing misconduct. Watchdog identifies nodes that are 
misbehaved, and the Pathrater strategy helps to redirect protocols to prevent packet 
movement of those nodes. The yield of these two strategies improves the efficiency of a 
relatively mobile network by 17 per cent, thus growing the ratio of overhead transmis-
sion to data transmission from 9 to 17 per cent of the regular routing protocol.
The black hole attacks are a serious problem widespread in mobile ad hoc networks 
[25]. Work focuses on the vulnerabilities of MANET, and it looks at the black hole 
attacks. They portrayed the creation of an enhanced algorithm called Radical Watch-
dog and Pathrater for recognizing and removing black hole attacks. In the article [26], 
the authors introduced a scheme called cluster-based trust to alleviate the internal 
attacks. In this research, the network is divided into cluster groups. Every cluster is 
certified as having the cluster head. The node decides the trust value and delivers it 
to the head of the cluster for their one-hop neighbours. In addition, the cluster head 
gives its participant nodes the certificate of confidence. This mechanism gives a good 
fraction of packet delivery and resilience to internal attacks. A novel technique is pro-
posed to secure MANETs by addressing network configuration and security issues 
during the response and recovery phase [27]. This work analysed the threats to secu-
rity and presented the security goals to be achieved and set up a stable key manage-
ment system in an ad hoc communication environment. A MANET-based algorithm 
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for effective security and trust management is provided in [28]. In the sense that the 
produced nonce is not easily detectable, the time-based nonce is produced at specific 
time intervals that give the suggested approach reliability. It has been compared with 
the already existing trust-based approach and finds better detection performance of 
the security threat in MANET. Several techniques are discussed in [29], for exam-
ple, reverse engineering, repacking, and hex editing to circumvent the host anti-virus 
signatures. Comprehensive comparison studies were conducted of various methods 
where malware could get the hosts from outside of the networks. A new honey-net-
based intrusion detection technique is also discussed. In MANETs, a complete survey 
of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is well presented in [30, 31]. They categorize the 
architectures for intrusion detection framework in the MANET, and each one is ideal 
for evaluating and comparing various network infrastructures on node cooperation. 
Similarly in another research [21], authors proposed pseudonym generation-based 
genetic algorithm to solve the location privacy problem in vehicular ad hoc network, 
and thus guaranteed un-traceability by an adversary. Further, authors of [22] study 
the physical layer security issues in vehicular environment. They show that how the 
secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability of a vehicular network can improved 
with respect to the source power and eavesdropper distance.
Due to vast applications of WSNs, it is ensuring that the only permitted availabil-
ity of information is accessible via sensor nodes is often an open challenge. In this 
review work [32, 33], twenty-two features have been presented in which a secure 
user authentication mechanism should be in place, and then, seven possible schemes 
were tested against the features specified. The analysis has been started from Wong’s 
work [34] in 2006 and has been concluded at Vaidya et al.’s technique implemented 
in 2012 [35]. In each scheme, the user impersonation and gateway nodes (GWN) 
bypass attacks and are likely. There is almost no scheme like that provides consumer 
confidentiality and repairability in case of failure or theft of smart cards. A scheme 
that only withstands an impersonation attack by a sensor node and a parallel session 
attack [36]. The replication attack and the fake verifier attack can only be taken on 
scheme suggested by Wong et al.’s and Tseng et al.’s in [34, 37]. Yoo et al.’s scheme offer 
mutual authentication between SN and GWN, and Khan-Alghatbar’s scheme achieves 
success in mutual authentication between users and GWN and even SN and GWN 
[36, 38]. Just one scheme avoids DoS attack and offers hidden parameter protection 
to the gateway node. In short, no scheme is completely protected to all available fea-
tures and all the strategies meet no authentication feature. The network communi-
cation security is one of the most important challenges in WSN [39]. HWSNs has 
optimized network capacity and introduced high-resource network sensor nodes. 
An efficient adaptive authentication and key management schemes are being pro-
posed for HWSNs in this article. The proposed protocol provides the authentication 
and key management for HWSNs along with optimization of security level, memory 
consumption, computational complexity, and overhead coordination which in effect 
enhances energy efficiency. The key distribution algorithm described here for pro-
ducing dynamic keys focuses on pre-existing information. Therefore, the exchange 
of keys does not involve a secure channel and the process of sharing. Therefore, it 
increases security and energy efficiency.
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We carry out an extensive literature review and make an analysis of the existing tech-
niques for the identification and removal of different forms of attacks within the ad hoc 
network. Our work culminates with the design of a digitally signed secure acknowledg-
ment algorithm for enhanced security in the ad hoc network. It aims to tackle Watch-
dog’s restricted communication power and collision problems with receivers with 
better securing the system by securing acknowledgment, node authentication, and 
packet authentication with digital signature technique.
2  Preliminary studies
The presence of attackers in the network cannot be taken too lightly. Therefore, the 
basic functionality of different attacks that may impact the various securing schemes of 
MANET needs to be understood. In this section, few essential parameters such as secu-
rity goals, attack models, and usability attributes have been discussed. Moreover, this 
section also describes the various intrusion detection schemes like Watchdog, 2-Ack. 
These preliminary studies are indeed needed for a better understanding of our proposed 
security mechanism: DSSAM.
2.1  Security goals, security attack models, and usability attributes
This subsection presents various attacks that are supposed to be resisted by MANETs. 
The various useful features are also presented in this subsection that should offers by 
the proposed authentication method to provide an amicable and a reliable security 
mechanism. The different security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
end-to-end authentication, may be threatened by various security attacks [33, 40]. The 
comparative study of various security attacks in terms of their target and its prevention 
is illustrated in Table 1 [41].
2.1.1  Security goals (SG)
The different kinds of security goals are as given:
Table 1 Comparative study of various security attacks: target and prevention
Security attacks 
(SA)
Active/passive Threaten Target of SA Prevention
Traffic analysis Passive Attacks againstconfi-
dentiality/privacy











Hash function to assure 
data integrity; SHA-1 
or MD5
Replaying Active
Repudiation Active Attacks against 
integrity & authen-
tication
Modification of data 
& disturbance of 
source and destina-
tion authentication
Hash functions & digital 
signature techniques




Check identity & pass-
word of each users in 
MANET
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a. SG1. Confidentiality All communicating individuals (i.e. approved parties) can 
understand the content of a message.
b. SG2. Integrity Guarantee that the message received at another individual is the same 
as the message originally sent by the sender when the message is inserted into the 
network (i.e. the message will not be modified in any way).
c. SG3. Availability Message shall be made accessible only to authorized entities.
d. SG4. Authentication Guarantee that anyone sending or accessing the sensitive mes-
sage has to be approved.
2.1.2  Security attack (SA) models
Figure 1 also shows different security threats as follows:
a. SA1. Snooping This is a passive type of attack relating to unauthorized access or inter-
ception of communications content. SA1 may be prevented by using encipherment 
methods to make the content of communications non-intelligible.
b. SA2 Traffic Analysis: Such groups of attackers basically consider one communication 
pattern within the MANET environment.
• Network traffic monitoring: e.g. log files, Web pages, etc.
• Seek to obtain valuable statistical analytical information: e.g. who interacts with 
whom, where, for how long, where? And who cares about what content, etc.?
c. SA3. Modification This is something of a deliberate kind of attack. Attackers attempt 
to change the information in order to make their own benefit after accessing the doc-
ument. In this scenario, attackers also often seek to delete or interrupt the post, to 
harm or benefit the machine.
d. SA4. Masquerading Masquerading or spoofing form of attack may be deployed 
on the ad hoc mobile network, while someone else is being impersonated by the 
attacker. Firstly, an intruder intercepts one or more legitimate authentication queries. 
Later, modify this request to allow it to pass MANET’s authentication test and get 







Modificaon Masquerading Replaying Repudiaon
Fig. 1 Various possible security attacks
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e. SA5. Replaying Anyway, in this SA model, the intruder receives a copy of a message 
received by the legitimate user to either access the MANET or trick the lawful user 
by claiming himself to be a genuine service provider. If an intruder fails, then it could 
be considered the assault as a replay defence threat.
f. SA6. Repudiation It is something of a particular kind of attack from the one that has 
been mentioned before. SA6 is conducted by either source or destination on one of 
the two permitted communication parties within the MANET. The message sender 
denies later that he sent the message in this case, or the receiver can later deny that 
he received the message.
g. SA7 DoS: It is an aggressive kind of attack and generally very normal. It can slow it 
down or completely disrupt a system/network service [30]. In this scenario, attackers 
may initiate several ways to reach the target. We can inject too many fake requests 
into the network that the server crashes due to the heavy traffic load. If the intruder 
succeeds in launching this attempt, then the node of MANET is irresponsive, and no 
one can link to it.
2.1.3  Usability attributes (UA)
The proposed authentication MANET scheme also supports various usability attributes 
along with resistance capacity against different attacks. The several usability attributes 
are listed out in Table 2 with its descriptions.
Table 2 Important usability attributes of authentication mechanism with its description
UA Attributes’ name Description
UA1 Authentication between MANET’s user and inter-
mediate node
Since end-users may request for services or informa-
tion, MANET intermediate nodes provide services/
information. Therefore, mutual authentication 
between end-users and intermediate node 
becomes essential
UA2 Authentication between MANET’s end users Authentication should also be done between two 
end-users, i.e. the sender and receiver in order to 
avoid repudiation
UA3 User’s amicable registration phase Registration phase from registration authority should 
be amicably and not put any kind of burden on 
users like remembering to the random number, 
etc., until not received the smart card
UA4 Password change facility: user friendly and secure Whenever the user needs to change the password, it 
should be friendly without interrupting registration 
authority. Keeping the same password for a long 
time is not suggested due to vulnerability towards 
password guessing. Moreover, the password 
changing mechanism must be secure in order to 
avoid false updating from the adversary
UA5 Creation of session key In order to provide good mutual authentication 
between two authorized communication parties, 
to keep confidentiality of messages and to provide 
a secure communication atmosphere after the end 
of the session generation of session key becomes 
an important concern
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2.2  Intrusion detection techniques in MANETs
Each node in MANETs presumes that other nodes work together to transmit and 
receive data. This paves the attackers the opportunity to respond and carry out the 
malicious operation with few compromised nodes on the network. To address this 
problem, three important functions, namely prevention, detection, and recovery, have 
been considered [31]. These functions provide three-layered security to MANETs. 
This section discusses the intrusion detection system usually the second security layer 
[32]. Two classical detection approaches, namely 2-ACK and Watchdog.
2.2.1  Watchdog method
The Watchdog methodology acts as a DSR extension. The feature named Watchdog that 
detects mischievous nodes; it has also built a component called Pathrater that calculates 
a path for these nodes to flee. Each node must execute certain modules on the network. 
Often Watchdog listens promiscuously for transmission of the next node. This also 
checks that the node is forwarding the received packet correctly. The Watchdog enables 
the feature of detection if the node has altered with the payload. The major question 
for this method is how it will perform, so the solution is to fit the listened packet to 
the freshly sent packet buffer. The Pathrater module processes data that the Watchdog 
receives to score the efficiency of any other node in the network knows and calculates a 
route metric derived by comparing the node scores in the route. The packets should then 
be routed through direction with the highest metric. This program can never be turned 
against the network because such conduct will be detected easily. Node X (mischievous) 
may falsely complain that node B does not forward packets in a route A–X–B–C–D. 
Nonetheless, acknowledgment of a message from A to D is moving accurately from D 
to A (Node X cannot leave packets or their acknowledgment, because both A & B will 
consider this malfeasance), and then, A is conscious that B is not misconducting because 
it is part of the route.
Considering the name of the path as A–B–C, the drawback of this framework is that 
in some subsequent situations the Watchdog operating in node A may fail to identify a 
node that is misbehaving.
• There may be a packet clash in A when A is listening to B. In this scenario, A can-
not say if the collision was triggered by B transmitting the packet (well-behaving) or 
by transmitting another node when B has not transmitted the packet (misbehaving);
• A listen to the B forwarding to C, it seems that B correctly transmits the packet. Node 
A, however, cannot determine whether it has been received by C or crash in C and B 
did not re-send (misbehaving) the packet.
• Node B can change its transmission capacity (misbehaving) to allow A to identify 
that B is transmitting a packet to C but that C is not receiving it.
• Nodes B and C (both of which are misbehaving) will cooperate with the launch of 
an attack. Node transfers a packet to C appropriately, but it does not say C drops the 
packet.
• Node B can lose packets at such a lower rate than A’s Watchdog’s minimum thresh-
old for misbehaviour.
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The above-described method can be better understood with the block diagram of 
Fig.  2. It detects the misbehaving nodes [11]. Suppose a path runs from node S to D 
through A, B, and C. Still, A is not capable of transmitting to C, but it can respond to B. 
So, A can tell if B broadcast the packet. If encryption is not conducted on each connec-
tion (which itself is an expensive and complex affair), then A can also say whether B has 
tampered with either payload or header.
The DSR routing protocol can identify misconduct at the forwarding point. The weak-
ness of Watchdog lies in the fact that it may not be capable of detecting a node mistreat-
ing in the context of following collisions:
• Ambiguous collisions,
• Collisions with receiver,
• Limited transmission power,
• False misbehaviour,
• Collision and partial dropping.
2.2.2  2‑ACK method
It is a network layer strategy for detecting links that are misbehaving and mitigating their 
impact. This technique can be implemented as an extension to establish routing proto-
cols such as DSR in MANETs already. A 2-ACK packet is assigned a fixed two hops path 
in the opposite way of the network traffic route. To overcome the weakness of Watch-
dog, Liu et al. [23] proposed a 2-ACK method. It aims to overcome Watchdog’s limited 
transmitting power and collision problems with receivers. It responds as acknowledges 
on each data packet transmitted over two hops distance and all three consecutive nodes 





















Fig. 2 Watchdog method
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Suppose three consecutive nodes (triplet) alongside a path are N1, N2, and N3. Node N1 
will deliver packet 1 to N2, and N2 will deliver the same to N3.
Upon receiving the packet, N3 generates a 2-ACK packet containing the reverse path 
between N3 and N1 and return to N1. This message, when received by N1, shows packet 
successfully communicated from N1 to N3 or else, if this 2-ACK packet is not delivered 
within a predefined time, all N2 and N3 nodes will be identified as malicious. The same 
procedure applies in the remaining route to each of the three successive nodes. A con-
siderable amount of unfavourable overhead network was added to the acknowledgment 
process in order to process each packet transmission [42, 43].
The above method we can better understand with a block diagram and a more explicit 
working approach. Figure  3 exhibits the working model of the 2-ACK method. In the 
route discovery process of the MANETs DSR system, the path from a source node (S) to 
a destination node (D) finds out. When N1 delivers a data packet to N2, and N2 transfers 
it to N3, it is uncertain if N3 receives the data packet successfully or not. There is such 
confusion, even when no nodes are misbehaving. The problem gets even more serious 
in open MANETs with potential nodes that misbehaved. The 2-ACK scheme requires 
a clear acknowledgment from N3 to notify N1 of its positive reception of a data packet. 
If node N3 receives the data packet efficiently, it passes a 2-ACK packet to N1 over two 
hops (i.e. the opposite routing route direction, as shown) with the discovery of the asso-
ciated data packet. The triplet [N1 → N2 → N3] comes from the direction of initial data 
traffic. N1 uses such a triplet to track the N2 → N3 connection. For display simplicity, 
we mark N1 as the 2-ACK packet recipient or the observer node and N3 as the 2-ACK 
packet sender in the triplet [N1 → N2 → N3]. For any group of triplets along the path 
such a 2-ACK connection happens. Consequently, only the first router of the source 
does not act as a 2-ACK packet sender just before arrival and destination the last router 
will not be functioning as 2-ACK receivers. The 2-ACK packet sender keeps a record 
























Fig. 3 2-ACK method
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example, after N1 sends a data packet on a particular direction, say, [N1 → N2 → N3] 
shown in Fig. 3, it attaches the data ID to LIST (see Fig. 4, showing the data structure 
retained by the observing node), i.e. to its list corresponding to N2 → N3). At the same 
moment, a list of data packets transmitted, Cpkts, is incremented.
Each ID will remain on the list for τ seconds at N1, the reception timeout for 2-ACK. 
Before the expiration of the time if a 2-ACK packet matching to this ID, the ID will be 
deleted from the list. Alternatively, the ID would be deleted at the end of its timeout 
period, incrementing a counter called Cmis. Once N3 encounters a data packet, it deter-
mines if it will send a 2-ACK packet to N1. 2-ACK packets must accept only a fraction 
of the data packets to reduce the extra overhead routing caused by the 2-ACK method. 
Such a percentage is called the Ratio (Rack) identification factor. By adjusting the Rack, 
we can efficiently balance the overhead for 2-ACK packet transfers. Node N1 watches 
the behaviour of node N2 and N3 for a time called Tobs. At the end of the observation 
period, N1 calculates the sum of missing 2-ACK packets as Cmis / Cpkts and compares 
them with a Rmis threshold. When the ratio is greater than Rmis, it is deemed to be 
misbehavioural and N1 sends out a RERR packet (or misbehavioural notification). Since 
only a fraction of the obtained data packets is identified, Rmis will satisfy Rmis > (1–
Rack) with the goal of removing false alarms triggered by such a partial acknowledgment 
technique. The node obtains or overhears such a RERR marks the N2 as misbehaving 
connection N3 and adds such misbehaving links to the blacklist it maintains. If a node 
later begins its own data flow, it stops using these connections as part of its route as mis-
behaving. As shown in Fig. 5, the pseudo-coded 2-ACK method is given for the 2-ACK 
packet sender side (N3) and the observing node side (N1) with the formal way of repre-
senting the 2-ACK execution process.
2.3  Digital signature
In the conventional signature scheme, a handwritten signature is embodied with the docu-
ments which specify that this person is responsible for it. The importance of signature can 
be seen in everyday circumstances, such as contract signing, money withdrawn from the 
bank, and letter writing. One of the most identification and authentication mechanisms in a 
now day’s digital world is the digital signature. It is a process to sign a message that is stored 
in electronic form, and then, this signed message can be sent to the network towards its 
destination. It allows source users to create a code for the message that acts as a signature. A 
digital signature for any message can be created in the public key set-up by taking a message 
hash value and encrypting it or signing it using a private key of its own. Basically, digital 
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Fig. 4 Data structure maintain by observing node
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scheme mainly offers some set of security abilities that very hard to implement in any other 
way.
Fig. 5 2-ACK executions process
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2.3.1  Needs of digital signature
In general, the message authentication defends two communicating parties from any other 
third party that is exchanging the message with each other. But still, it does not provide the 
protection between them against each other. There may be numerous forms of the dispute 
between two parties could that are as follows:
a. Receiving party (Bob) may create a different message and claim that it has come from 
source party (Alice). For this, Bob creates a message and attached an authentication 
code with this message by using a shared key, which was shared by Alice and Bob, 
previously.
b. After sending the message, later Alice can deny that he has sent messages to Bob. So, 
there is no way for Bob to prove that this message has in fact received by the Alice.
In the above both situations, it could be said that there is no complete trust between 
two communicating parties. Due to this reason, something more than authentication is 
required.
The best way to avoid the above problem could be the use of the digital signature. The 
analogous to digital signature is the handwritten signature. The digital signature must 
meet specific attributes:
• Able to verify the sender identification along with the time and date of signature.
• Able to authenticate the content of the information at the time of signature.
• If any disagreement exists than any other third party must be able to verify it.
2.3.2  Digital signature techniques
Any digital signature technique includes two different components: one is the signing 
algorithm  (SIGNK) and the second one is the signature verification algorithm (SIGN_
VERk), both should be the polynomial-time functions of any key that is from key-space. 
The first one will be kept secret, and the second one will be publicly available. The formal 
definition or steps of the creation of the digital signature and its verification schemes 
are presented out in Table 3. Consider any two communicating parties, say the sender 
is Alice and the receiver is Bob. Now, Alice may create the message (X) and encrypt 
this message or sign the message using signature (S) that depends on his own private 
key (d). After receiving the signed message, Bob will verify or decrypt this signed or an 
encrypted message: Y = S(X) using Alice public key (e) that is available in the Public Key 
Directory (PKD). For a pair of the message and signature/signed message (X, Y), the ver-
ification algorithm reverts either true or false that depends on whether signature Y is 
valid or not for created message X.
The hash function or hash code and possibilities of digital signature creation tech-
niques are shown in Fig. 6. A hash function (H) could be implemented in any size of the 
block of data that is variable length and generates a fixed message length as shown in 
Fig. 6(A). A hash function is required because the implementation of the digital signa-
ture scheme on the large size of massage, especially in the public key set-up is very costly. 
Figure 6b, c shows the creation of the digital signature and its verification in symmetric 
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and public key set-up, respectively. In symmetric key set-up, Bob can play the role of the 
adversary by modifying the original content of a message. Alice does not have any way to 
prove his actual message. So, overall, these issues can be avoided by the public key set-
up. However, in both public and symmetric key set-up, the only authentication can be 
made still confidentiality of information is not preserved. Authentication of the users as 
well as the confidentiality of information both could be maintained from digital creation 
schemes of Fig. 6d, e because here the message is not directly sent. In both schemes, the 
signing process is done with Alice’s private key. Finally, it is sent out in the channel using 
a symmetric shared key and Bob public key, respectively. In the state-of-the-art, there 
are a few digital signature schemes such as RSA, El-Gamal, Rabin algorithm, etc. Here, 
the RSA digital signature algorithm has been used.
2.3.2.1 RSA digital signature scheme The Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) crypto-
system can be used to provide a digital signature, and it is known as the RSA digital signa-
ture scheme. The required set-up to create the RSA signature is demonstrated in Table 4. 
Moreover, Fig.  7 illustrates the explicit demonstration of the creation and verification 
of the RSA digital signature scheme. RSA algorithm [44] is helpful to provide secure 
data transmission in a public-key cryptosystem that basically deals with digital signature 
including the message recovery scheme. The key generation in RSA digital signature is 
similar to the key generation in RSA.
Table 3 Formal Way to Create and Verify Digital Signature Technique
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Fig. 6 a Hash function and Digital Signature: b Symmetric Key Set-up, c Public Key Set-up, d both Public and 
Symmetric Key Set-up, e Only by Public Key Set-up
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3  Problem definition
The approach proposed is designed to solve three shortcomings of the Watchdog sys-
tem, namely receiver collision, limited transmission power, and false identity problem. In 
Table 4 In RSA Set-up Key Generation Phase
Fig. 7 RSA digital signature: creation and verification
Page 19 of 29Srivastava et al. J Wireless Com Network         (2021) 2021:12  
the case of receiver collisions (Fig. 8), after I transmit Packet 1 to J, it will try to overhear 
whether J will forward this packet to K; meanwhile, X is forwarding Packet 2 to K. In 
such case, I overhear that J has successfully forwarded Packet 1 to K but failed to detect 
that K did not receive this packet due to a collision between Packet 1 and Packet 2 at K.
In the case of limited transmission power (Fig. 9), J purposely decreases its transmis-
sion capacity to maintain its own battery life, so it is loud enough to be grasped by I, but 
still not strong enough to be heard by K.
In the case of false misbehaviour acknowledge (Fig. 10), while I secretly recorded suc-
cessfully that J forwarded Packet 1 to K, I also inform J as behaving badly. Due to the 
Fig. 8 Receiver collisions
Fig. 9 Limited transmission power
Fig. 10 False misbehaviour report
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versatile platform and remote distribution of MANETs, attackers can easily catch and 
hack nodes to execute this attack to report misbehaviour.
4  Proposed method: DSSAM
DSSAM stands for a digitally signed secure acknowledgment method that using the digi-
tal signature technique to avoid the falsification of packets by the attacker. DSSAM con-




It uses the advantage of a 2-ACK method which already helpful to get overcome basic 
problems with Watchdog approaches, namely insufficient transmitting capacity and col-
lision with the receiver. After that, we tried to solve the false misbehaviour activity by 
securing acknowledgment, node authentication, and packet authentication. The function 
of such detection schemes largely depends on the acknowledgment packets. Hence, it is 
also very important to guarantee that acknowledgment packets are valid and authentic 
as well as secure. To this concern, a digital signature is introduced.
We safeguard two-layered defence for security. Additional bits allocated in the first 
layer are used to carry sequence numbers, keeping transmission time fixed to define 
the packets sequence in the proper interval for that time. This is done for the trans-
mission of both packet and acknowledgment. The next layer is defined by twofold 
safeguarding the forwarded packets, by putting digital signature. According to the 
draft of DSR [45, 46], seven bits are reserved in the DSR header. These seven bits have 
been used to maintain sequence numbers. We assume bi-directional communication 
links with source and destination not being malicious. Both data packets and packets 
of acknowledgments must be digitally signed by the source and authenticated by the 
destination. In our proposed scheme, RSA is used to encrypt the packet.
5  Performance evaluation
This section discusses the simulation method, setting up of simulations and review of 
comparative results with existing ones such as DSR, Watchdog, and 2-Ack.
5.1  Simulation approach
To examine the performance of DSSAM with several kinds of attacks, we have 
planned two case scenarios to simulate diverse kinds of attacks by seeding propor-
tionate misbehaving nodes in our simulation terrain set-up:
CASE 1: Firstly, we conducted a packet-dropping and delay attack [47]. The mali-
cious nodes lose all the packets got, meaning that mollify all the packets are lost. This 
scenario’s concept is to measure the efficiency of intrusion detection against both the 
two limitations of the Watchdog; restricted transmission power and collision with the 
receiver as when there is a fixed range specified transmission power.
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CASE 2: It is considered to examine intrusion detection systems performances 
against fake acknowledgment. Here, malicious nodes more cleverly behave with often 
falling the packets and return a fake acknowledgment whenever possible.
5.2  Simulation set‑up
We have conducted the simulation using Intel Core i5 2.5 GHz processor and 8 GB 
1600  MHz DDR3 main memory, with the consideration of both the physical layer 
and MAC layer 802.11b for simulation. Further, the experiment is performed through 
the QualNet Simulator-7.0 on a desktop as a simulation resource. For each scheme, 
each simulation ran 10 Telnet sessions and calculated the average. The 2-ACK scheme 
observational time is fixed at Tobs = 0.9  s. Unless otherwise stated the Rack = 0.25 
recognition ratio being used by the 2-ACK scheme, acknowledgment miss ratio 
Rmis = 0.80 and a timeout value of T = 0.12 s. Along with the above explained param-
eters, there is Table 5, which gives the configuration of the experimental set-up that 
is used for the analysis of the simulation. Thereafter, the performance of the proposed 
method has been evaluated with respect to by seeding malicious node percentage in 
terrain as 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 45% in uniformly distribution one by one.
We have observed the performance of DSSAM and compared it with Watchdog and 
2-Ack. For this, we have considered Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF), Routing Over-
head (RO) and Average End-to-End Delay, as the performance metrics:
PDF is the proportion of the number of packets received by the top layer sources 
(i.e. application layer) and the number of packets obtained by the destination. This 
explains the rate of loss the transport protocol should experience.
Table 5 Parameters for simulation
Parameters
Packet size 512 Bytes
Packet rate 4 packets/sec
Data traffic CBR(UDP)
Dimensions 1000 m x 1000 m
Number of nodes 50
Minimum speed 1 m/s
Maximum speed 10 m/s
Maximum hops 5
Radio transmission range 200 m
Simulation time 1500 s
CBR rate 50Kbps
Malicious node percentage in terrain 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 45%
Antenna model Omni-direction
Propagation model Two ray
Mobility model Random Waypoint
Channel type Wireless
Network interface type PHY IEEE802.11 / Wireless
MAC Type 802.11b
Interface queue type Queue/ Drop tail / PriQueue
Link layer type LL
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 RO: RO defines as the routing data of the network obtained by an application using 
a proportion of the required bandwidth. This additional data are called as Routing 
Overhead.
Average End-to-End Delay: It is the average amount of time that is taken by a packet 
to reach final destination from source. It is the sum of delays at links. The delay at a 





Average End-to-End Delay = Ʃ (tr—ts)/Pr, where ts is the packet send time and tr is 
the packet receive time.
During the simulation, the origin node sends an RREQ packet to all other neighbours 
that broadcast will be within its range of communication. Neighbours received this 
RREQ message, so each neighbour adds their addresses consequently to the message 
and then sends an attached message to their neighbours. There is one important sce-
nario that whenever any node receives more than one same RREQ, it completely denies 
it. In case any failed node is noticed, a message RERR is sent to the origin node, which 
usually implies a split link in flat routing protocols like DSR. When the RREQ destina-
tion node is identified as the end destination node, this node activates an RREP message 
and transfers back from the original RREQ message to the source node using the reverse 
route request process.
With reference to the digital signature system, we took up an open-source library 
called Botan [48]. For RSA schemes, we have considered a 512-b RSA key for each node 
in this network. For each node, we presumed that a private key and a public key were 
created and circulated in advance. The key file sizes of 512-b are 256 and 512 B, respec-
tively. The signature file size for RSA is 120 B.
5.3  Results analysis and discussion
Case 1: Here, malicious nodes lost packets completely which passing through it. Fig-
ure 11 and Table 6 show the results, based on Packet Delivery Fraction. Here, we spot 
that all acknowledgment-based intrusion detection systems method like 2-ACK and 
DSSAM perform better than the Watchdog method. Our proposed method DSSAM 
outperforms Watchdog’s performance by an average of 15% as 20% malicious nodes 
availability into the network. We observe that 2-ACK and DSSAM acknowledgment-
based schemes are capable of detecting malfeasance with a receiver collision and limited 
transmission capacity. Nevertheless, if the percentage of malicious nodes exceeds 40%, 
the efficiency of our suggested DSSAM method is average 17% good than others. The 
reason behind that is the introduction of Packet Authentication Scheme (PAS) under 
DSSAM approach with choked route avoiding system, which is followed for the next 
time transmission through similar route with similar choked nodes. As whenever sender 
PDF = (Data Packets Received)/(Data Packets Sent)
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wait too long to receive a PAS acknowledgment from the destination node; means, that 
the waiting time exceeds the predefined threshold. This level is met for DSSAM only up 
to 50% of the involvement of malicious nodes, as network rises with more than 50% of 
malicious nodes, preceded by its fully compromised network. Thereafter, it again started 
decreasing because of generalize rule for any communication network; if malicious node 
presence increased by more than 50% then communication network system breaking up 
rate is increase by two times of normal decay rate in every 10% slot.
The obtained Routing Overhead in case 1 of simulation environment is shown in 
Fig. 12 and Table 6. It is observed that DSR and Watchdog scheme attains better result 
because they do not require acknowledgment method to detect mischief-nodes. As 
remaining two schemes; 2-ACK and DSSAM have effective overhead. However, the 
DSSAM requires a digital signature and acknowledgment for all data packets, which 
cause to increase the Routing Overhead. Nevertheless, DSSAM still performs well com-
pared to other acknowledgment techniques in most cases.
The graph of Average End-to-End Delay for case 1 has been shown in Fig. 13, and its 
value is tabulated in Table 6. It is noticed that DSR and Watchdog method achieves bet-
ter performance in terms of delay due to not requirement of acknowledgment packet 
to identify mischief-nodes as well in compared to 2-ACK and DSSAM. DSSAM took 
more Average End-to-End Delay time because of the enhanced feature of 2-ACK as digi-
tal signature incorporate for advance security feature as compared to previously existed 
method. However, if the percentage of malicious nodes exceeds by 30%, our suggested 
DSSAM framework is become bit quite slower more than others. Even watchdog perfor-
mance is better in respect to Average End-to-End Delay.
Case 2: Here, we seeded malicious nodes that send the fake acknowledgment to the 
source node as it is likely. This case is designed to check the intrusion detection system’s 
performance under fake acknowledgment. Figure  14 and Table  6 show the results for 
Packet Delivery Fraction. If the percentage of malicious nodes is 10%, DSSAM’s output is 
around 3% higher than 2-ACK. DSSAM scheme beats all other schemes when the mali-
cious nodes reach at 20% and 30%. DSSAM maintains the PDR to over 85% and if we 
Fig. 11 Case 1-Packet Delivery Fraction
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compare it with 2-ACK than the output is 18% higher approximately. It performs similar 
to 2-ACK also in few point for particular this case. We be certain that the introduction of 
PAS scheme under DSSAM method framework mainly contributes to this performance.
Table 6 Average results outline
MALICIOUS NODES (%) DSR WATCHDOG 2‑ACK DSSAM
Case 1: Packet Delivery Fraction
0% 1 1 1 1
10% 0.88 0.86 0.98 0.96
20% 0.72 0.70 0.95 0.97
30% 0.68 0.66 0.90 0.92
40% 0.66 0.67 0.89 0.20
45% 0.04 0.011 0.02 0.35
Case 1: Routing Overhead
0% 0.01 0.02 0.2 0.03
10% 0.033 0.035 0.41 0.23
20% 0.033 0.037 0.44 0.32
30% 0.032 0.038 0.42 0.33
40% 0.02 0.038 0.56 0.39
45% 0.03 0.04 0.64 0.46
Case 1: Average End-to-End Delay
0% 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.186
10% 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.18
20% 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.25
30% 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.32
40% 0.24 0.11 0.3 0.42
45% 0.267 0.128 0.49 0.6
Case 2: Packet Delivery Fraction
0% 1 1 1 1
10% 0.79 0.81 0.90 0.97
20% 0.71 0.69 0.80 0.91
30% 0.65 0.63 0.78 0.82
40% 0.60 0.59 0.72 0.71
45% 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.11
Case 2: Routing Overhead
0% 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.03
10% 0.020 0.029 0.31 0.33
20% 0.029 0.032 0.43 0.39
30% 0.0321 0.037 0.48 0.55
40% 0.039 0.037 0.59 0.64
45% 0.03 0.04 0.71 0.85
Case 2: Average End-to-End Delay
0% 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.121
10% 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.25
20% 0.19 0.134 0.37 0.32
30% 0.29 0.31 0.47 0.37
40% 0.32 0.33 0.62 0.41
45% 0.42 0.381 0.71 0.43
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Fig. 13 Case 1-Average End-to-End Delay
Fig. 14 Case 2-Packet Delivery Fraction
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Figure  15 and Table  6 display the simulation outcomes of the Routing Overhead in 
case 2. DSSAM in certain cases retains a lower overhead network particularly in com-
parison to 2-ACK and Watchdog schemes. Routing Overhead, however, is increasingly 
growing with the rise in malicious nodes. Therefore, there is a requirement for more dig-
ital signatures and acknowledgment packets. The Routing Overhead for DSSAM is more 
compared to other techniques; this is due to the hybrid nature and extra processing for 
digital signature. However, it is compensated by high Packet Delivery Fraction and better 
security level in the packet communication.
The outcome of Average End-to-End Delay for case 2 in Fig.  16 and Table  6 exhib-
its moderate high for 2-ACK and DSSAM method with 40% or more malicious node 
presence. This high average delay presence due to the features of 2-ACK algorithm 
incurred extra overhead for two hops moment with acknowledgement-based handshak-
ing property. In case 2, if more than 30% nodes shall start falsifying acknowledgement, 
in that point actual successful transmission would be reduced because proportion-
ate percentage of retransmission increased to get actual transmission due to the false 





























Fig. 16 Case 2-Average End-to-End Delay
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acknowledgement. DSSAM method is also facing same situation as 2-ACK but due to 
hybrid nature of extra security decrease the Average End-to-End Delay for DSSAM.
6  Results summary
The results revealed affirmative performances against Watchdog and 2-ACK, in the 
circumstances of receiver collision, limited transmission power, and false acknowl-
edgement; proposed method also provides secure ACK with node authentication and 
packet authentication. Our proposed method DSSAM outperforms with Watchdog’s 
and 2-ACK’s performance in Packet Delivery Fraction in both the cases for up to 50% 
malicious node presence in the communication network. In Routing Overhead con-
cern, the non-acknowledgement methods attain better results than acknowledge-
ment-based method. Our proposed method also lags here, but it still performs well 
compared to other acknowledgment techniques in most cases. The Average End-to-
End Delay in case 1, it is observed that DSR and Watchdog method achieves better 
result because they do not require acknowledgment method to detect mischief-nodes 
as compared to 2-ACK and DSSAM. DSSAM took more Average End-to-End Delay 
time because of the digital signature incorporate for advance security feature as com-
pared to previously existed method.
7  Conclusion and future scope
There are many possible reasons for packet drop in MANETs that fall broadly under two 
types, namely intentional and unintentional mischief. The unintentional misbehaviour 
could be caused by overloaded node (due to extreme dearth of CPU cycles and restricted 
buffer space), collision, and traffic delays. The packet drop can happen due to connection 
errors because of intrusion or evaporation by the mischievous intruders. The packet-
dropping attack represents a massive risk to secure the MANETs. This paper explains 
that we have described and simulated the method DSSAM in a standard environment 
and compared it with existing methods under different scenarios. The obtained simu-
lation outcome provides enhanced performance against Watchdog and 2-ACK in the 
points of false misbehaviour acknowledgment, collision with the receiver, and the lim-
ited transmission capacity. We incorporated the digital signature in the method. While 
in a few circumstances, it creates more Routing Overhead, but increases the network’s 
efficiency in terms of the fraction of packet transmission. It would be an interesting topic 
for a future research study to understand and estimate the performance when partially 
misbehaving nodes intentionally degrade performance owing to their greediness for sav-
ing their own battery power, and to estimate the battery consumption with varying per-
centage of greedy nodes in the same environment.
Abbreviations
MANETs: Mobile ad hoc networks; DSSAM: Digitally Signed Secure Acknowledgement Method; DSR: Dynamic Source 
Routing; WSN: Wireless Sensor Network; TARP: Trust Aware Routing Protocol; IDSs: Intrusion detection system; 2-ACK: 
Two hop acknowledgement method; SG: Security goals; SA: Security attack; DoS: Denial of Services; Cpkts: Counter of 
forwarded data packets; Cmis: Misbehaviour counter; SIGNK: Signing algorithm; UA: Usability attributes; SIGN_VERk: Sig-
nature verification algorithm; PKD: Public Key Directory; Tobs: Observation period of the 2-Ack scheme; Rack: Acknowl-
edgement ratio; Rmis: Acknowledgement miss ratio; PDF: Packet Delivery Fraction; RO: Routing Overhead.
Page 28 of 29Srivastava et al. J Wireless Com Network         (2021) 2021:12 
Authors’ contributions
Ashutosh Srivastava and Sachin Kumar Gupta are the main authors of the current paper. They contributed to the devel-
opment of the ideas, design of the study, theory, result analysis, and paper writing. Mohd Najim, Nitesh Sahu, Geetika 
Aggarwal, and Bireshwar Dass Mazumdar contributed to the result analysis and paper revision. All authors read and 
approved the final manuscript.
Funding
Not applicable.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1 JNPS OxyJoy Pvt. Ltd. (OXY), Atal Incubation Centre, CDC Building, BHU, Varanasi 221005, Uttar Pradesh, India. 2 School 
of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Kakryal, Katra 182320, Jammu & 
Kashmir, India. 3 Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Jeddah, Jed-
dah 21589, Saudi Arabia. 4 Centre for Applied Research in Electronics, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi 110016, India. 
5 School of Science and Technology, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham NG11 8NS, UK. 6 Department of Com-
puter Science and Engineering, Institute of Engineering and Rural Technology, Prayagraj 211002, Uttar Pradesh, India. 
Received: 2 July 2020   Accepted: 8 January 2021
References
 1. Internet Engineering Task Force, MANET Working Group Charter, Available from: IETF MANET Group Character Sector 
(2013). https ://tools .ietf.org/html/draft -ietf-manet -term [Last Access: 13 January 2020].
 2. B. Wu, J. Chen, J. Wu, M. Cardei, A survey of attacks and countermeasures in MANET, in Wireless Network Security, 
Signals and Communication Technology, Springer, Boston, MA, 103–135 (2007). https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-
33112 -6_5
 3. S. Tanwar, J. Vora, S. Tyagi, N. Kumar, M.S. Obaidat, A systematic review on security issues in vehicular ad hoc net-
work. Secur Privacy 1, 5 (2018)
 4. J. Singh, K. Singh, Congestion control in vehicular ad hoc network: a review. Next-Gener Netw 2018, 489–496 (2018)
 5. K. Kumar, S. Kumar, O. Kaiwartya, P.K. Kashyap, J. Lloret, H. Song, Drone assisted flying ad-hoc networks: mobility and 
service-oriented modeling using neuro-fuzzy. Ad Hoc Netw. 106, 102242 (2020)
 6. H. Miranda, L. Rodrigues, Preventing selfishness in open mobile ad-hoc networks, in IEEE Proceeding Seventh CaberNet 
Radicals Workshop, 1–6 (October 2002).
 7. M. Faisal, S. Abbasa, and H. U. Rahman, "Identity attack detection system for 802.11-based ad hoc networks", EURA-
SIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 128, (2018).
 8. L. M. Feeney, M. Nilsson, Investigating the energy consumption of a wireless network interface in an ad-hoc networking 
environment, in IEEE INFOCOM, Conference on Computer Communications, Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of 
the IEEE Computer and Communications Society (Cat. No.01CH37213), Anchorage, AK, USA, 1548–1557 (2001).
 9. A. U Makarfi, K. M Rabie, O. Kaiwartya, X. Li, R. Kharel, Physical layer security in vehicular networks with reconfigur-
able intelligent surfaces (2019). arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.12183.
 10. L. Buttyan, J.P. Hubaux, Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks. A Graduate Text Book (. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007).
 11. S. Marti, T. Giuli, K. Lai, M. Baker, Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc networks, in 6th Annual Interna-
tional Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, Boston, MA, USA, 255–265 (August 2000). https ://doi.
org/10.1145/34591 0.34595 5.
 12. K.N. Qureshi, A.H. Abdullah, O. Kaiwartya, S. Iqbal, R.A. Butt, F. Bashir, A Dynamic congestion control scheme for 
safety applications in vehicular ad hoc networks. Comput. Electr. Eng. 72, 774–788 (2018)
 13. L. Buttyan, J. P. Hubaux, Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs, IEEE First Annual Workshop on 
Mobile and Ad-hoc Networking and Computing (Cat. No.00EX444), Boston, MA, USA, USA, 87–96 (August 2000). 
https ://doi.org/10.1109/MOBHO C.2000.86921 6.
 14. J.P. Hubaux, T. Gross, J.Y. LeBoudec, M. Vetterli, Toward self-organized mobile ad-hoc networks: the terminodes 
project. IEEE Commun. Mag. 39(1), 118–124 (2001). https ://doi.org/10.1109/35.89438 5
 15. O. Kaiwartya, S. Kumar, D.K. Lobiyal, A.H. Abdullah, A.N. Hassan, Performance improvement in geographic rout-
ing for vehicular ad hoc networks. Sens. MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland 14(12), 22342–22371 (2014). https ://doi.
org/10.3390/s1412 22342 
 16. M. Alotaibi, Security to wireless sensor networks against malicious attacks using Hamming residue method. 
EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Network. 2019, 8 (2019)
 17. S. Buchegger, J. Y. Le Boudec, Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol: cooperation of nodes, fairness in 
dynamic ad-hoc networks, in 3rd ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad-hoc Networking and Computing, 
Switzerland, 226–236, June 2002. https ://doi.org/10.1145/51380 0.51382 8
 18. S. Zhong, J. Chen, Y.R. Yang, Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-Based System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE 
INFOCOM IEEE INFOCOM (San Francisco, USA, 2003), pp. 1–11
 19. O. Kaiwartya, S. Kumar, Guaranteed geocast routing protocol for vehicular adhoc networks in highway traffic 
environment. Wireless Pers. Commun. 83(4), 2657–2682 (2015)
Page 29 of 29Srivastava et al. J Wireless Com Network         (2021) 2021:12  
 20. M. Jakobsson, J.P. Hubaux, L. Buttyan, A micropayment scheme encouraging collaboration in multi-hop cellular 
networks. Financial Cryptography, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg 2742, 15–33 
(January 2003). https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45126 -6_2
 21. B. Chaudhary, K. Singh, Pseudonym generation using genetic algorithm in vehicular ad hoc networks. J. Discrete 
Math. Sci. Cryptograp. 22(4), 661–677 (2019)
 22. A. U Makarfi, K. M Rabie, O. Kaiwartya, K. Adhikari, X. Li, M. Quiroz-Castellanos, R. Kharel, Reconfigurable intelligent 
surfaces-enabled vehicular networks: a physical layer security perspective (2020). arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.11288
 23. K. Liu, J. Deng, P.K. Varshney, K. Balakrishnan, An acknowledgment-based approach for the detection of routing 
misbehavior in MANETs. IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput. 6(5), 536–550 (2007)
 24. L. Abusalah, A. Khokhar, M. Guizani, Trust Aware Routing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, IEEE GLOBECOM, Communi-
cations Society, San Francisco IEEE GLOBECOM, Communications Society, San Francisco (CA, USA, December 2006), 
pp. 1–5. https ://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCO M.2006.264
 25. N. Soganile, T. Baletlwa, B. Moyo, Hybrid Watchdog and Pathrater Algorithm for Improved Security in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks, in International Conference on Wireless Networks, ICWN’15, 162–167 (July 2015).
 26. R. Murugan, A. Shanmugam, Cluster based trust mechanism for mitigation of internal attacks in mobile ad-hoc 
networks. Int. J. Soft Comput. 7(6), 294–301 (2012). https ://doi.org/10.3923/ijsco mp.2012.294.301
 27. L. Zhou, Z. Haas, Securing Ad-hoc Networks. IEEE Network Mag. 13(6), 24–30 (1999)
 28. A. Singh, M. Maheshwari, N. Kumar, “Security and Trust Management in MANET”, Information Technology and 
Mobile Communication, AIM 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, New York: Springer-
Verlag. 147, 384–387 (2011). https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20573 -6_67
 29. F. Daryabar, A. Dehghantanha, H. Broujerdi, Investigation of malware defense and detection techniques. Int. J. 
Digit. Inf. Wirel. Commun. 1(3), 645–650 (2011)
 30. T. Anantvalee, J. Wu, A survey on intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc networks, in Wireless Network Security, 
Springer, Boston, MA, 159–180 (2008). https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-33112 -6_7
 31. Y. Zhang, W. Lee, Y. Huang, Intrusion detection techniques for mobile wireless networks. Mobile Networks and Appli-
cations, 1–16 (2003).
 32. C. Modi, D. Patel, B. Borisaniya, H. Patel, A. Patel, M. Rajarajan, A Survey of intrusion detection techniques in 
cloud. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 36(1), 42–57 (January 2013)
 33. S. Kumari, M.K. Khan, M. Atiquzzaman, User authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks: a review. Ad-
hoc Netw. 27, 159–194 (2015). https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc .2014.11.018
 34. K. Wong, Y. Zheng, J. Cao, S. Wang, A dynamic user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks, in Interna-
tional Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, Trustworthy Computing, IEEE Computer Society, Taichung, 
Taiwan, 244–251, (June 2006). https ://doi.org/10.1109/SUTC.2006.16361 82
 35. B. Vaidya, D. Makrakis, H. Mouftah, Two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement in wireless sensor 
networks. Secur. Commun. Netw. 9(2), 171–183 (2012). https ://doi.org/10.1002/sec.517
 36. S.G. Yoo, K.Y. Park, J. Kim, A security-performance-balanced user authentication scheme for wireless sensor 
networks. Int. J. Distrib. Sens. Netw. 2012, 1–11 (2012). https ://doi.org/10.1155/2012/38281 0
 37. H.R. Tseng, R.H. Jan, W. Yang, An Improved Dynamic User Authentication Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks, 
in IEEE Global Communications Conference, Washington (DC, USA, November 2007), pp. 985–990. https ://doi.
org/10.1109/GLOCO M.2007.190
 38. M.K. Khan, K. Alghathbar, Cryptanalysis and security improvements of two-factor user authentication in wireless 
sensor networks. Sensors 10(3), 2450–2459 (2010). https ://doi.org/10.3390/s1003 02450 
 39. S. Athmani, A. Bilami, D.E. Boubiche, EDAK: an efficient dynamic authentication and key management mecha-
nism for heterogeneous WSNs. Future Gener. Comput. Syst. 92, 789–799 (2017). https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.futur 
e.2017.10.026
 40. P. Ballarini, L. Mokdad, Q. Monnet, Modeling tools for detecting DoS attacks in WSNS. Secur. Commun. Netw. 6, 
420–436 (2013). https ://doi.org/10.1002/sec.630
 41. M.A. Ferrag, L. Maglaras, A. Argyriou, D. Kosmanos, H. Janicke, Security for 4G and 5G cellular networks: a survey of 
existing authentication and privacy-preserving schemes. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 101, 55–82 (2018). https ://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.10.017
 42. T. Sheltami, A. Al-Roubaiey, E. Shakshuki, A. Mahmoud, Video transmission enhancement in presence of misbehav-
ing nodes in MANETs. Int. J. Multimedia Syst. 15(5), 273–282 (2009)
 43. A. Patwardhan, J. Parker, A. Joshi, M. Iorga, T. Karygiannis, Secure routing and intrusion detection in ad-hoc networks, in 
3rd International Conference on Pervasive Computing Communication, 191–199 (August 2005).
 44. R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. 
ACM 21(2), 120–126 (1978)
 45. D. Johnson, D. Maltz, Dynamic source routing in ad-hoc wireless networks . Mobile Comput. 5, 153–181 (1996)
 46. D.B. Johnson, D.A. Maltz, J. Broch, DSR: the dynamic source routing protocol for multi-hop wireless ad-hoc networks, 
in Ad-hoc Networking Chapter 5. ed. by C.E. Perkins (Addison-Wesley, London, 2001), pp. 139–172
 47. S. Om, M. Talib, Wireless Ad-hoc network under black-hole attack. Int. J. Dig. Inf. Wirel. Commun. Soc. Dig. Inf. Wirel. 
Commun. 1(3), 591–596 (2011)
 48. Botan: Crypto and TLS for Modern C++ Library. http://botan .rando mbit.net/. [Last Access: October 2019].
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
